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Abstract 
Pierre Bourdieu’s Domination masculine (1998) has an earlier version published as 
an article in 1990. In order to deconstruct in vivo the working of sociological 
paradigm-alchemy, a close reading of the Bourdieusian narratives is offered. The 
paper starts with a comparison of the article and the book. After summing up the 
main claims of the book’s critical reception, Bourdieu’s statements are intended to 
be questioned, according to which the school, the family, the state and the church 
would reproduce, in the long run, masculine domination. The paper also seeks to 
identify the methodological trick of the Bourdieusian vision on history, namely that, 
metaphorically speaking, he compares the streaming river to the riverside cliffs. It is 
argued that when Bourdieu discusses “the constancy of habitus”, the “permanence in 
and through change”, or the “strength of the structure”, he extends his paradigm 
about the displacement of the social structure to the displacement of the men/women 
relationship. Hence, it is suggested that, in opposition to Bourdieu’s thesis, 
masculine domination is not of universal validity but its structural weight and 
character have fundamentally changed in the long run.  
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Resumen 
La dominación masculina de Pierre Bourdieu (1998) tiene una versión anterior 
publicada como artículo en 1990. Con el fin de deconstruir el funcionamiento del 
paradigma sociológico-alquimia, se ofrece una lectura atenta de las narrativas 
alrededor de este autor. El artículo comienza con una comparación del artículo y el 
libro mencionados. Después de resumir las principales contribuciones alrededor de 
la recepción crítica del libro, los argumentos de Bourdieu son cuestionados, en 
particular sobre su posicionamiento alrededor de la escuela, la familia, el estado y la 
iglesia, las cuales se encargan de reproducir, a largo plazo, la dominación masculina. 
El artículo también trata de identificar el truco metodológico de la visión 
bourdieusiana en la historia, a saber, que, metafóricamente hablando, se compara el 
río a los acantilados de la orilla. Se argumenta que cuando Bourdieu habla de "la 
constancia de habitus", la "permanencia y mediante el cambio", o la "resistencia de 
la estructura", se extiende en su postura sobre el desplazamiento de la estructura 
social y el desplazamiento de la relación hombres - mujeres. Por lo tanto, se sugiere 
que, en oposición a la tesis de Bourdieu, la dominación masculina no es de validez 
universal ya que su peso estructural y carácter han cambiado de manera fundamental 
en los últimos años.  
Palabras clave: dominación masculina, Bourdieu, historicidad  
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ierre Bourdieu’s Masculine Domination (Bourdieu, 1998) was 
granted the privilege of becoming a sociological classic in his 
lifetime. Published in French in 1988 and then within a few 
years in several languages, this publication is noteworthy for 
several reasons. First, since publication in 1998 it has had unparalleled 
appeal in France, being published in 78 000 copies in 1998 and another 30 
000 copies four years later. These are stellar numbers for a social science 
publication. Of his works, only La misere du monde (1993) and the items of 
the Liber Raison d’agir-series were printed in more copies (Thébaud, 2006, 
pp. 175-176). Second, it is important because – though gender inequalities 
were latently included in earlier phases of the oeuvre – it became the target 
of concentrated attention towards the end of the author’s career and can, 
therefore, help the reinterpretation of the life’s work retrospectively. 
Thirdly, the book is intriguing because like a teaching aid it demonstrates 
several virtues and limitations of Bourdieu’s thinking in a concentrated 
form. Below, after starting with a short comparison of the Masculine 
Domination’s two versions, the main statements of the book’s critical 
reception will be summed up. Then, on the basis of questioning Bourdieu’s 
claims, namely that the school, the family, the state and the church would 
reproduce, in the long run, masculine domination, the paper will seek to 
identify the main problem of the Bourdieusian vision on history.  
 
The Article and the Book 
 
When the readers take the English version of Pierre Bourdieu’s Masculine 
Domination (2001) in hand, they are probably unaware that this book has 
an earlier version (Bourdieu, 1990) published as an article in Actes de la 
recherche en sciences sociales, the journal he founded in 1975 and headed 
until his death. We thus have the exceptional chance to steal a glimpse of 
the creative Bourdieusian workshop and study in vivo the working of the 
sociological paradigm-alchemy by starting with a short comparison of the 
article of 1990 and the book of 1998.  
The main thesis of the article is that masculine domination – actually the 
model of all kinds of domination – is a social institution deeply inculcated 
in the objective social and subjective mental structures over the millennia, 
practically structured by the same laws in the pre-modern Kabyle society of 
P 
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the Mediterranean region as in London’s Bloomsbury district in the early 
20th century, in Virginia Woolf’s circle. The basis for its emergence is the 
libido dominandi or the instinctive desire after domination, a sort of sense 
of duty based on an inner drive that a man “owes himself”, acquired 
unconsciously in the course of socialisation. This drive, or illusio 
dominandi, is constitutive of masculinity, and causes men to be socially 
instituted to let themselves be caught up, like children, in all the games of 
domination that are socially assigned to them, of which the form par 
excellence is war. At the same time, men also become victims – victims of 
their own illusion. 
In this sexually determined, “sexualized and sexualizing” social order of 
labour division, men are active mainly in the public spheres, while women 
in the non-public, private spheres are not oriented towards profit or power 
and mostly require unlimited time input. The latter are practically goods of 
exchange in the games of men based on honour and dignity, serving in this 
capacity the reproduction of men’s symbolic capital. Women, argues the 
author, are disposed to generate liking, hence it is no wonder that they 
spend a considerable part of their time with cosmetic work. They are 
mainly in charge of the ceremonies organised upon aesthetic rules (family 
and firm feasts, literary salons, receptions, etc.), so they may fill important 
positions in different cultural fields and are specialised for producing, 
differentiating symbolic distinctions. Besides, continues Bourdieu, 
borrowing the nice metaphor of Virginia Woolf, they act as flattering 
mirrors in which men can view their enlarged images. Ultimately, then, all 
women do enrich the wealth of men who possess them. At the same time, 
they have the perspicacity of the outsiders, so they can view the “most 
serious” games of men “with amused indulgence”. 
It is ascribed salient significance to habitus, i.e. behavioural patterns 
fixed in durable dispositions, which govern human praxis at the non-
conscious level; being perceptible, these “structured, structural structures” 
are liable to social classification and differentiation. Bourdieu writes about 
“the somatisation of power relations”, and formulates the thesis according 
to which the socially constructed biological body is also a politicised body, 
or, more precisely, no less than “embodied politics”. He refers, among 
others, to elementary school education which incorporates in the 
dispositions of growing generations a multitude of sexually differentiated 
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ethical, political, or even cosmological elements – e.g. teaching pupils how 
to hold the (masculine) right hand, how to walk, look into someone’s eyes, 
dress – and so on, and so forth...  
The arguments are supported on the basis of two empirical references. 
The main empirical source is the pre-modern Kabylian community in 
Algeria, where women are mainly associated with negative connotations 
while men with positive ones (they are like nobles, notes the author). All 
activities connected with the concepts of “internal”, “damp”, “low” and 
“crooked” (not only child-rearing but such dirty chores as mucking out the 
stable) are performed by women, as compared to the “external”, “official”, 
“straight”, “dry”, “tall” (etc.) activities of men. Interesting paragraphs can 
be read about the manifestation of the major cultural oppositions in the 
division of the body: high/low, up/down, pure/ impure, public/ private, 
legitimate/illegitimate. (Typically enough, the sexual intercourse itself is 
deemed “normal” and “classical” in the case where man is over woman, 
while all other positions of love-making are condemned as perverted and 
often penalised by sanctions.)  
The other reference is Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse, the 
protagonist of which, Mr Ramsey is an excellent figure to illustrate modern-
time masculine dispositions based on the libido academica, ie. a special 
variation of the libido dominandi. An early 20th-century academic 
intellectual, Mr Ramsey is a man “of whose words are verdicts”, all whose 
predictions “are self-fulfilling, they make themselves true”, and whose 
“paternal prophecy is both a forecast of science and a prediction of wisdom, 
which sends the future into the past". He experiences the fantasies of e 
libido academica which express themselves in warlike games: “Yet he 
would not die lying down; he would find some crag of rock, and there, his 
eyes fixed on the storm ... he would die standing” (Woolf is quoted by 
Bourdieu – Bourdieu’s italics). 
These statements are formulated almost unchanged in the book of 1998: 
there is no substantial difference between the two texts as to the set of 
concepts and the empirical basis. However, there are significant differences 
between the two versions. First, to start with a seemingly less important 
element, there are considerable aesthetic differences between the two 
versions, to the benefit of the latter. Bourdieu was presumably dissatisfied 
with the formal structure of the article. As a normalien, i.e. one-time student 
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of a Grande École of the French social scientific elite of greatest prestige, 
the École Normale Supérieure founded by Napoleon, he would have been 
heir to a philosophical tradition which ascribes at least as much significance 
to the “form” as to the “contents”. That means that ideas should be put forth 
with the elegance of the continuous resolution of (seeming) paradoxes 
arising from binary oppositions. Needless to say: this obligation is satisfied 
with self-evident ease in the author’s first text variant, too – as in nearly all 
his works.  
While the article was divided into seven chapters of varying length and 
more or less ad hoc titles (Symbolic rape: physical compulsion; 
Somatisation of power relations; Social construction of sexuality; Social 
genesis of illusion and libido dominandi; Clearsightedness of the outsiders; 
Women as objects of exchange; The institutional libido), the book appears 
to comply more thoroughly with the formal requirements of the scholastic 
tradition. It is divided into three parts, the first (A magnified image) 
containing five, the last (Permanence and change) four (?)1, the middle 
chapter (Anamneses of the hidden constants) three sections, and the whole 
being framed by a preamble and a conclusion. Thus, a quasi-symmetry is 
created, which is at the same time put in parentheses via a subtle structural 
dissonance, in order to avoid the appearance of orthodox conservatism.  
In the English version, the Latin references are lost. The “preamble” is 
rendered as “prelude”, the “post-scriptum" as “postscript”, the latter omitted 
from the contents; hence the discussion about love is “hidden” in the 
English edition. The post-scriptum may belong to the third part – extending 
it to five sections – or may not. It also depends on the vantage point 
whether the appendix is taken for an essential (sub) chapter upsetting the 
formal balance, or for a structural unit of secondary importance compared 
to the primary argumentation. At any rate, the fact that the author attaches 
this section after his final conclusion appears to suggest that his thoughts 
about the gay and lesbian movement are beyond his main concern.  
But however important the requirements of a rhetoric tradition may be, 
they are certainly insufficient to prompt a new text variant. That needs other 
things, too. Such as – to mention another important factor that has great 
significance in the French intellectual context with a penchant for subtle 
distinctions – the altered reference horizon that is deemed important for the 
argumentation. Taking a close look at the sources and references in the two 
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texts, considerable differences can be found. What first strikes the eye is the 
conspicuously high number of self-citations (eight in the article and 
fourteen in the book). The index of the French edition does not contain the 
Bourdieu name, so the self-citations can only be gleaned from the text one 
by one.  
The English version is more correct, including the Bourdieu-item in the 
index. It is not clear, however, why only eight of his works are named as 
references. Furthermore, the number of an item’s occurrence is also lower 
than actually is the case. For example, out of the 14 references to The Logic 
of Practice, a mere four are noted in the English edition. The other four self-
references of the article (Le nord et le midi; L’ontologie politique de Martin 
Heidegger, La noblesse d’état and Le patronat) are not included in the book. 
By contrast, there are six references in the book to pre-1990 writings that 
are not named in the article. All in all, the number of self-references is 
seventeen in the article and twenty-seven in the book. 
As for references to others, in both versions, there are relatively few 
citations of other authors. Still, there are far more references in the book, so 
it is clear – especially in the light of what was said above about the formal 
structure – that the enlarged version satisfies more completely the 
requirements of scholasticism. The top list of authors in the book is led by 
Foucault and Sartre with four mentions, respectively. Foucault’s importance 
had grown with the passing of the time (from one reference in the article). 
Although in most cases his name appears in a polemic context, the fact that 
Bourdieu finds him (of all people) worth arguing with is significant. The 
opposite is the case with Sartre. In the article there is a lengthy, though 
small-typed, particularly méchant passage about how the philosopher’s 
private imagination-laden with fears of castration, conceiving of the sexual 
act via the metaphor of “a wasp drowned in jam”, becomes a “fundamental 
philosophical intuition” – a kind of intuition that discusses with self-evident 
ease the “honey-sweet death of the für-sich” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 15)2.  
In the article, he makes a reference to some thirty authors, usually one 
(rarely two-three) time(s). They include those often cited in other Bourdieu 
works (Bergson, Goffmann, Kant, Husserl, Kafka, Lévi-Strauss, Van 
Gennep, Freud, Lacan) and some less known, mainly French researchers 
not connected to feminism. In a footnote, he refers to the “feminist 
discourse stranded frequently in essentialism” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 4), 
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naming Féral, Irigaray and Kristeva. Far more authors are cited in the book, 
usually also only once. From these references, however, not only Féral, 
Irigaray and Kristeva, but other key authors of Gender Studies are also 
missing – although he refers to post-1990 works at least thirty times. 
Among the feminist authors, MacKinnon’s Feminism Unmodified (1987) is 
quoted three times, Chodorow’s The Reproduction of Mothering... (1978) is 
referred to twice, Lee Bartky’s Femininity and Domination... (1990) is 
mentioned once. Judith Butler is also mentioned, but – not really correctly – 
the citation from her is used in support of Bourdieu’s argument:  
 
Judith Butler herself seems to reject the “voluntaristic” view of 
gender that she seemed to put forward in Gender Trouble, when she 
writes [in Bodies that Matter]: ‘The misapprehension about gender 
performativity is this: that gender is a choice, or that gender is a 
role, or that gender is a construction that one puts on, as one puts 
clothes on in the morning’ (Butler 1990, p. 103; quoted in 
Bourdieu, 2001, p. 103).  
 
Unfortunately, Bourdieu forgets to note here that in this passage Butler 
words the critique of the extreme interpretations of the Gender Trouble. It is 
thus far from discarding her previous theory, as Bourdieu claims. 
The most important difference between the two texts is that Bourdieu 
includes a completely new chapter, entitled Permanence and Change, plus 
an appendix and post-scriptum into the book. The inclusion of these new 
texts, however, does not alter the main thesis about the universality and 
pertinence of masculine domination. On the contrary: his main thesis is that  
 
The changes visible in conditions in fact conceal permanent 
features in the relative positions: the levelling-out of the chances of 
access and rates of representation should not be allowed to mask 
the inequalities which persist in the distribution of boys and girls 
among the various types of schooling and therefore among possible 
careers (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 90).  
 
He uses the term “permanence in and through change” (Bourdieu, 2001, 
p. 91), by claiming that: 
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Whatever their position in the social space, women have in 
common the fact that they are separated from men by a negative 
symbolic coefficient which, like skin colour for blacks, or any other 
sign of membership of a stigmatized group, negatively affects 
everything that they are and do, and which is the source of a 
systematic set of homologous differences (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 93).  
 
Consequently, “the structure of the gaps is maintained” (Bourdieu, 2001, 
p. 91) because “girls internalize, in the form of schemes of perception and 
appreciation not readily accessible to consciousness, the principles of the 
dominant vision” (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 95). Or to put it differently: “the 
constancy of habitus (...) is one of the most important factors in the relative 
constancy of the structure of the sexual division of labour” (Bourdieu, 
2001, p. 95).  
In the post-scriptum, writing about domination and love – he states that 
in border cases there might be exceptions to the general rule of masculine 
domination. Such a border case is “the enchanted island of love, a closed 
and perfectly autarkic world which is the site of a continuous series of 
miracles, can be snatched from the icy waters of calculation, violence and 
self-interest” (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 110). In the appendix dealing with the gay 
and lesbian movement, he raises the following questions: “How can one 
stand up to a hypocritical universalism without universalising a 
particularism? (...) How can one prevent the conquests of the movement 
from ending up as a form of ghettoisation?” (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 123) 
Undoubtedly, the fact that he formulates the problems connected to the gay 
and lesbian movement in the form of questions suggests some relaxation of 
his rigid position represented by the article of 1990 where he writes:  
 
Women’s studies, black studies, gay studies (...), by turning a social 
problem raised by a dominated group into a sociological problem 
without any special procedure, ignore everything that constitutes 
the reality of the topic while they exchange the social relation of 
domination with a substantial entity, with an essence, thought in 
itself and for itself, with an idea of a complementary entity (as 
happened in the case of men’s studies, too) (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 30). 
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Critiques to Masculine Domination 
 
The fact itself that the most prestigious and most often quoted sociologist of 
the last decades of the 20th century has written a book on masculine 
domination draws the attention of the international scientific community to 
this issue. As it was pointed out, Bourdieu gives an elegant and witty 
analysis of pre-modern mountain Kabyle society, stressing the social 
embeddedness of masculine domination and its decisive structural weight. 
The book convincingly points out to certain permanent elements of 
masculine domination, proving that the habitus-concept might be relevant if 
we would like to study symbolic domination and symbolic violence. The 
value of the book is further enhanced by some conceptual innovations, like 
libido dominandi as the dispositional foundation of masculine domination 
and some related categories (libido sciendi, libido academica, illusion 
dominandi). 
That said, however, several critical remarks have also been formulated 
in the 17 years since the publication of Masculine Domination. Most of 
them find the book wanting in providing adequate empirical grounds for the 
statements3. As Wallace (2003) puts it: 
 
The sole "data" that informs Masculine Domination comes from 
anthropological information about the Kabyle society (a 
Mediterranean ethnic group) that Bourdieu gathered in the 1960s 
and a reading of Virginia Woolf's To the Lighthouse. By 
comparison with the thoroughness of his earlier work, Masculine 
Domination seems a brisk treatment of a subject that does not have 
Bourdieu's full attention. (...). As Terry Lovell (one of Bourdieu's 
most frequent and incisive critics) points out, "it is not always 
possible to know when [Bourdieu] is restricting his observations to 
the particular case of Kabyle society, when he is extending them to 
encompass the whole Mediterranean culture of honour/shame, 
including that of the modern period, and when he is offering 
universal generalizations (p. 20). 
 
Undoubtedly, as Toril Moi writes (Moi 1991, p. 1033) “Bourdieu’s 
empirical data are almost exclusively from his investigations among the 
Kabyle people of Algeria carried on in the 1950s which he has not updated 
or put to self-reflection”. This makes Anne Witz accuse him of “dubious 
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gender anthropology” (Witz 2004, p. 211). Particularly defective are his 
concrete references to late 20th century developments; ignoring these does 
reduce the relevance of the author’s ambition to provide a broad historical 
horizon. This neglect of data is unusual for Bourdieu whose best works (for 
example Bourdieu 1984, 1989, 1992, 1993) are characterised by a 
sophisticated interpretation of subtle qualitative and quantitative variables. 
In short, it is not unfounded to suspect that in this work he only collected 
the arguments that would substantiate his preconceived thesis. 
Another group of critical remarks charge the author with “determinism” 
and “pessimism”, referring to a problem often raised in the critical 
interpretation of the whole Bourdieusian oeuvre. Some critics say 
Bourdieu’s thinking is characterized by a “hyperfunctionalist”, extreme 
structuralism (Joas & Knöbl, 2011, p. 25)4; others, more politely, opine that 
“the author is more at home in analyzing the specificities of reproduction 
than those of social change” (Perrot et al., 1999, p. 209). Again some claim 
that “he overemphasises the significance of order and structure” (Skeggs 
2004, p. 30) while some more poignant critics (Chambers, 2005) charge 
that “he rules out social change”: 
 
Parts of Bourdieu’s analysis also imply that it will be difficult if not 
impossible for us even to conceptualise radical change, for he 
asserts that women living under patriarchy lack the cognitive 
resources to do so (Bourdieu 2001, p. 35, 2000, p. 170). Such a 
conclusion is problematic for it seems to rule out social change, and 
conflicts with the fact that change does occur, sometimes as the 
result of radical theorizing, for example of feminists about and 
against patriarchy. Bourdieu’s contention that change in 
consciousness also requires change in the underlying social 
structures does have some force (p. 334). 
 
There are critics who think that “the living conditions, practices, views 
and struggles of women today are not reflected at all in Bourdieu’s text, 
which instead paints the picture of a gender order so completely doxic and 
closed that it seems almost totalitarian” (Krais, 2006). Here is the root of 
his pessimism, for a viewpoint that “his view of the perpetual reproduction 
of class-based inequality appears to leave little prospect that things will get 
better” (Joas & Knöbl, 2011, p. 29). Although Bridget Fowler (the most 
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sympathetic of British feminists toward Bourdieu’s theory) stresses that 
Bourdieu’s praxis theory is not totally deterministic, for in the final analysis 
people always have the possibility of reflection5, she still takes the view 
that Masculine Domination cannot grasp the periods of the transformation 
of patriarchic structure with due subtlety, and is particularly defective in the 
analysis of changes in the period of capitalist modernity (Fowler, 2003). 
In addition, another group of critical remarks, related to the above-cited 
ones, argue that the author fails to refer to the literature on gender studies. 
“There is something frustrating about the ease and briskness with which 
Bourdieu dismisses whole schools of feminist thought” – argues Wallace 
(2003). Some critics acidly note that for the lack of citations, for the gross 
references and ambiguous allusions Bourdieu’s dissertation would not pass 
the test in the first year of a PhD course (Mathieu, 1999). According to 
Lovell (2001), 
 
Julia Kristeva and Luce Irigaray share a footnote in the 1990 
version in which they are summarily dismissed as essentialist – a 
familiar charge, but one against which defences have been mounted 
(Grosz, 1989; Whitford, 1991). Even this backhanded 
acknowledgement has disappeared by 1998. Bourdieu’s lack of 
engagement with those who already occupy the well-tilled ‘field’ 
of gender studies is quite remarkable (p. 44). 
 
Several reviewers propose that when a sociologist in a dominant 
position, who happens to be male, almost perfectly ignores the bulk of 
feminist and gender literature in a work on gender themes, and thus impairs 
the significance of the female agent’s history-forming power, he does not 
only represent the historical processes in a false light but also serves the 
symbolic reproduction of masculine domination (Lagrave, 2003, pp. 316-
317). As Beate Krais (2006) puts it: 
 
To reconstruct the standpoints of others – in this case, of women – 
Bourdieu would have had to do a thorough reading of the feminist 
research, which would have meant recognizing his feminist 
colleagues as ‘equal players’ in the intellectual field. Instead, he 
limited himself to his two ‘extreme cases’: his old material from 
Kabylia, and Virginia Woolf’s description of a bourgeois British 
family at the beginning of the 20th century (in her novel To the 
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Lighthouse, 1927), arguing that this approach could overcome the 
familiarity of the gender order and achieve the objectifying 
distance needed for the analysis. (…) It is difficult to understand 
why Bourdieu – who in his other works emphasizes the importance 
of symbolic conflict and struggle – pays only cursory attention to 
the symbolic struggles over the gender order. (...) Apparently, it is 
difficult even for critical male social scientists to reflect upon their 
own masculine position. On the other hand, critical female 
scientists often seem to share a similar blind spot as regards their 
own position, and a similar hesitance to accept the contributions of 
male colleagues who dare enter their territory – particularly those 
who represent strong analytical positions – like Bourdieu (pp. 123-
124). 
 
True enough: Bourdieu primarily calls feminist historiography to 
account for the study of institutions contributing to the maintenance of 
permanence, and by this rhetorical device he underestimates the importance 
of the agency of the feminist movement and the scientific reflection upon it. 
As he (Bourdieu, 2001) writes,  
 
a history of women (…) cannot be content, for example, to record 
the exclusion of women from this or that occupation, this or that 
branch or discipline; it must also take note of and explain the 
reproduction both the hierarchies (occupational, disciplinary, etc.) 
and of the hierarchical dispositions which they favour and which 
lead women to contribute to their own exclusion from the places 
from which they are in any case excluded (p. 83). 
 
It can be added that Masculine Domination reflects minimally on a few 
authors of feminist literature, but wholly ignores the representatives of the 
Studies on Men and Masculinities, making no attempt to ascribe the least 
importance to the plurality and differentiation of masculinity by involving 
in his analysis such key categories as Connell’s hegemonic masculinity 
(Connell, 1996), Brittan’s concept of “masculinism” (Brittan, 1989) or 
Whitehead’s (2002) masculine subjectivity. Nor is he interested in looking 
at forms of “masculine bonding” that is, different forms of connection and 
cooperation between men (clubs, pubs, sports communities, the army), 
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although this theme has become unavoidably institutionalised in Anglo-
Saxon social historiography (Tosh, 1994). 
 
School, Family, State and Church: Institutions of Permanence?  
 
In the new chapter of the book, aiming to set “the historical labour of 
dehistoricisation”, Bourdieu declares that “the major change has doubtless 
been that masculine domination no longer imposes itself with the 
transparency of something taken for granted. Thanks, in particular, to the 
immense critical effort of the feminist movement” (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 88). 
By referring to the increased access to secondary and higher education, 
waged work, public sphere, the degree of distancing from domestic tasks 
and reproductive functions, he also mentions “the substantive 
transformations seen in the conditions of women, especially in the most 
advantaged social categories” (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 88). However, as we 
have seen earlier, his main thesis is that “the structure of the gaps is 
maintained” between men and women (Bourdieu 2001, p. 91), and that 
“women have in common the fact that they are separated from men by a 
negative symbolic coefficient” (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 93). He defines the 
study of social institutions (church, state, school, family) sustaining 
continuity as the primary task of the approach to “the history of women” 
(Bourdieu, 2001): 
 
In fact, it is clear that the eternal, in history, cannot be anything 
other than the product of historical labour of externalisation. It 
follows that, in order to escape completely from essentialism, one 
should not try to deny the permanences and the invariants, which 
are indisputably part of historical reality, but, rather, one must 
reconstruct the history of the historical labour of dehistoricisation, 
or, to put it another way, the history of the continuous (re)creation 
of the objective and subjective structures of masculine domination. 
(...) Historical research cannot limit itself to describing the 
transformations over time of the conditions of women, or even the 
relationship between the sexes in the different epoch. It must aim to 
establish, for each period, the state of system of agents and 
institutions – family, church, state, educational system, etc., which, 
with different weights and different means at different times, have 
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helped to remove the relations of masculine more or less 
completely from history” (pp. 82-83). 
 
The question can be raised whether the school, the family, the state and 
the church have contributed, as it is claimed, to the maintenance of 
permanence. The most often mentioned institution by Bourdieu (2001) is 
the school6: 
 
The educational system, even when it had freed itself from the grip 
of church, continued to transmit the presuppositions of the 
patriarchal representation (based on the homology between the 
men/women relationship and the adult/child relationship) and, 
perhaps most importantly, those that are inscribed in its own 
hierarchical structures, all sexually characterized, between the 
various schools and faculties, between the disciplines (‘soft’ or 
‘hard’ – or. closer to the original mythical intuition – ‘desiccating’), 
between specialisms, that is, between ways of being and ways of 
seeing, or seeing oneself, one’s aptitudes and inclinations, in short, 
everything that combines to form not only social destinies but also 
self-images (p. 86). 
 
Taking a short-term perspective one may argue that women may 
primarily be successful in traditionally feminine, provident occupations, 
their pay is lower than men’s and that in most segments of the labour 
market the dominant positions are taken by men. When, however, the theme 
is looked at in a complex long-term historical context, it is particularly 
questionable that in the western world the school reproduces the gender 
differences in the long run. It cannot be ignored (and this fact is so obvious 
that it needs no references to prove) that while prior to the 19th century only 
daughters of upper-class families could have systematic private tutoring for 
many years, from the late 19th century women could also take part, first in 
elementary and intermediate levels of public education and from the 20th 
century in higher education as well. 
The long-term perspective clearly shows that while a hundred and fifty 
or two hundred years ago the overwhelming majority of women were 
locked out of the institutions of education, from the second half of the 20th 
century they have been present at all educational levels just like men. What 
is more, at the onset of the 21st-century women have a higher rate of 
MCS – Masculinities and Social Change, 5(2) 225 
 
 
schooling (and better results) in the younger generations than men. (It is not 
necessary to embark upon the impact of this phenomenon on the labour 
market and the division of work in the household). In other words: while 
the schools of the 19th century and earlier were almost exclusively peopled 
by men (as teachers, students and auxiliary staff), by the end of the 20th 
century, the structural gap between genders had disappeared. Consequently, 
the institution of education does not maintain the permanence of masculine 
domination, but serves the power balance between genders! 
Having a look at the subject index of the French edition, it can be found 
that the notion “family” used on 13 pages (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 138), but the 
relevant quotations are far shorter than those about school. Although it is 
mentioned that some changes have occurred but Bourdieu (2001) puts the 
emphasis on the factors of permanence: 
 
The family undoubtedly played the most important part in the 
reproduction of masculine domination and the masculine vision, it 
is here that early experience of the sexual division of labour and the 
legitimate representation of that division, guaranteed by law and 
inscribed in language, imposes itself (p. 85). 
 
Oddly enough, the validity of this strong statement is considerably 
decreased by being the only sentence in the whole book about the role of 
the family in the reproduction of masculine domination!7. Bourdieu 
mentions Chodorow’s (1978) famous book, but he fails to refer to a single 
researcher of family history. It may then be not farfetched to state that his 
idea of the correlation between family and masculine domination is 
tendentious and sketchy8. That is particularly conspicuous against the 
background of immense literature on the theme produced in the past half a 
century.  
One of the most relevant of these traditions is the “Sentiments 
Approach” among the followers of which there is a consensus that before 
the 17th century marriage was an economic, production-oriented and 
procreative unit in which the sexual act was not aimed at procreation but 
was considered as a sin (Aries, 1960; Shorter, 1976; Flandrin, 1979; 
Anderson, 1980; Stone, 1982). The prime aim of marriage was to 
(re)produce fortune and social position from one generation to the other. 
According to Stone (1982) and Flandrin (1979), in this early period, there 
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were no modern-type emotional ties between family members. From the 
17th century onwards important changes began. As Philippe Aries 
demonstrated in his often-quoted book (Aries, 1960), in aristocratic and 
highly educated families attitudes towards children gradually changed: 
specific children’s dress, toys, readings, games, and pedagogical 
programmes were devised for them, which means that the conditions for the 
emergence of “childhood” as a separate life period starts to be created. The 
“birth” of childhood entailed the parallel emergence of parenthood, that is, 
the development of the modern institution of maternal and paternal 
activities requiring the internalisation of appropriate emotions, duties, and 
goal-oriented educational tasks.  
All of these authors point out that the significance of the intimate sphere 
is upgraded in this process: husbands spend more time at home, in the 
company of their wives. “What really distinguishes the nuclear family (...) 
from other patterns of life in Western society is a special sense of solidarity 
that separates the domestic unit from the surrounding community” – writes 
Shorter in his groundbreaking “Making of the Modern Family” (Shorter, 
1976, p. 205). Or, as Anderson (1994) formulates it: “from the second half 
of the 18th century “domesticity had reached its zenith and spread to other 
social groups. (...) The home came to be seen as a haven, a retreat from the 
pressures of a capitalistically oriented competitive world” (Anderson, 1994, 
p. 47). Although it is still the man who is the master of the household, the 
strengthening of emotional ties in family life softens the rigidity of 
patriarchal dominance. With the decrease in family size and the increase in 
the importance of the child-rearing mother the centre of family life moves – 
to use Mary Ryan formulation – “from patriarchal authority to maternal 
affection” (Ryan, 1981, p. 102). The invention of modern motherhood 
(Dally, 1982; Badinter, 1981) and the identification of maternal activity 
with the essence of femininity mean that the growing legitimacy of the 
woman – paradoxically – will be rooted in the “mysterious,” “natural” and 
“irrational” otherness of the “weaker sex”. 
Bourdieu simply ignores perhaps the most momentous social change of 
the last third of the 20th century: the transformation of intimacy. He seems 
to overlook that from the 1960s something changed irrevocably in the 
Western world: a growing number of women have gained legitimate control 
of their own bodies. That does not merely mean their right to decide about 
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abortion, but also their growing claim to the right of sexual satisfaction9. 
Consequently, whilst the influence of the female agent increases, the 
legitimacy of masculine violence monopoly decreases. This process implies 
that men have to control their violent impulses in the intimate sphere and to 
incorporate dispositional elements that were associated with women in 
previous millennia. Consequently, the institution of the family does not 
maintain the permanence of masculine domination, but serves the power 
balance between genders! 
According to Bourdieu, the third key protagonist in dehistoricization and 
the maintenance of masculine domination is the state, with 9 loci in the 
index (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 138). As he writes (Bourdieu, 2001): 
 
[The state] has ratified and underscored the prescriptions and 
proscriptions of private patriarchy with those of public patriarchy 
inscribed in all the institutions charged with managing and 
regulating the everyday existence of the domestic unit. Without 
reaching the extremes of paternalist, authoritarian states (such as 
France under Pétain or Spain under Franco), full-scale realizations 
of the ultra-conservative vision which makes the patriarchal family 
the principle and model of the social order interpreted as moral 
order, based on the absolute pre-eminence of men over women, 
adults over children, and on identification of morality with the 
strength, courage and self-control of the body, the seat of 
temptations and desires, modern states have inscribed all the 
fundamental principles of the androcentric vision in the rules 
defining the official status of citizens (p. 87). 
 
Unfortunately, Bourdieu does not differentiate between the mid-20th 
century rightwing authoritarian states and the late 20th century, leftist social 
democratic “provident” states, among other things. Nor does he find it 
important to reflect upon the historically-culturally determined differences 
between, say, the Italian or Swedish state structures. And he also fails to 
consider how the functions of the state are connected to the other 
institutions, the family, school and church(es) in the long run – although 
several great narratives are at his disposal. The strongest thesis is offered by 
Norbert Elias’ opus magnum (Elias, 2000), in which the long-term 
transformations in the behaviour of the secular upper classes in the West are 
put under scrutiny. The kernel of the Eliasian argument is that upon 
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external social pressures, people develop self-control mechanisms which 
suppress “uncivilized”, animal-like behavioural elements based on 
violence. These suppressions function as feelings of shame, confusion and 
embarrassment. Hence, these feelings are not natural endowments but the 
internalised products of social-historical circumstances, namely that 
violence control is to be traced to the emerging state monopoly of violence 
and taxation.  
 
Through the formation of monopolies of force, the threat which one 
person represents for another is subject to stricter control and 
becomes more calculable. Everyday life is freer of sudden reversals 
of fortune. Physical violence is confined to barracks, and from this 
store-house, it breaks out only in extreme cases, in times of war or 
social upheaval, into individual life. (…) When a monopoly is 
formed, pacified social spaces are created which are normally free 
from acts of violence (Elias, 2000, pp. 369-372). 
 
In volume two of the book, Elias devotes a chapter (“Dynamics of 
Feudalization”) to the increase of population after the great migration, the 
internal expansion of society, the formation of new social organs and 
instrument, among other things (Elias, 2000, pp. 195-256). In chapter two 
of volume 2 (“On the Sociogenesis of the State”) he gives a systematic 
analysis of the interdependencies between state formation and civilizing 
process (Elias, 2000, pp. 257-362). If we take seriously the Eliasian thesis 
according to which, 
 
The rise in the division of functions also brings more and more 
people, larger and larger populated areas, into dependence on one 
another; it requires and instils greater restraint in the individual, 
more exact control of his or her affects and conduct, it demands a 
stricter regulation of drives and – from a particular stage on – more 
even self-restraint (Elias, 2000, p. 429). 
 
We might argue that whilst the influence of the female agent increases, 
the legitimacy of masculine violence monopoly decreases. To put it 
differently: according to Elias, the long-term psychologisation and 
pacification of social life imply that men have to control their violent 
impulses in different social spheres (including the intimate sphere), and to 
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incorporate dispositional elements that were associated with women in 
previous centuries. Consequently, in the long run, the institution of state 
does not maintain the permanence of masculine domination, but serves the 
power balance between genders! 
Let us finally say something about the church! Three continuous 
sentences can be found in the book (Bourdieu, 2001) about this institution 
(the index of the French edition refers to six pages where the concept of 
“church” appears):  
 
As for the church, pervaded by the deep-seated anti-feminism of a 
clergy that was quick to condemn all female offences against 
decency, especially in matters of attire, and was the authorized 
reproducer of pessimistic vision of women and womanhood, it 
explicitly inculcates (or used to inculcate)10 a familialist morality, 
entirely dominated by patriarchal values, with, in particular, the 
dogma of the radical inferiority of women. In addition, it acts, more 
indirectly, on the historical structures of the unconscious, notably 
through the symbolism of the sacred texts, the liturgy and even 
religious space and time (p. 85). 
 
He bases his arguments on three references, each dealing with a specific 
implication of Catholicism11. Unfortunately, these incidental references are 
not sufficient even for a sketchy outline of the historical dynamism of 
Catholic Church and Catholicism, just as the allusion to the conditions four 
or five centuries earlier does not have the force of evidence if valid 
statements about the role of the church in the maintenance of masculine 
domination are to be substantiated. Undoubtedly, a highly complex set of 
phenomena is to be considered, for the Roman Catholic Church has 
changed thoroughly in Europe in the past centuries. Moreover, different 
focal points and phenomena would have to be chosen for study when the 
topic is, let’s say, the Italian, the Irish, or the Polish Catholic Church, or, for 
that matter, some historical formation of eastern Catholicism. Then there is 
the row of fundamental changes triggered off by the Reformation, which 
also raises the question of conflicts and distinctions among the Protestant 
churches, in addition to the Catholicism Vs Protestantism opposition. 
Evidently, the Finnish Lutheran, British Anglican or German Calvinist 
churches (to mention randomly a few) are far away from each other in 
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historical dynamism, and each could only be comprehended in its complex 
relation to the given social structure. Regrettably, Bourdieu does not deal 
with the long-term transformation of social relations arising from the 
Reformation and wars of religion even in passing; nor does he allude to the 
enormous literature that has been created to illumine the correlations 
between the Protestant ethic, this-worldly asceticism, the inner 
differentiation of the church, inchoate capitalism, the institutions 
incorporating rational competition, and the historical variations of 
masculine domination. The name of Max Weber only crops up once in the 
book – in a wholly different context. 
Even without an in-depth analysis, however, it can be contended that out 
of the four institutions mentioned by Bourdieu these are the Christian 
churches that would provide the best-grounded arguments to prove that – 
notwithstanding all their changes and inner differentiation – they have 
contributed most to the reproduction and maintenance of masculine 
domination in the long run. To put it more cautiously, out of the four 
institutions it is the church in which the stoutest resistance to the forces of 
women’s emancipation can be expected to this day. At the same time, it 
ought also to be considered in a complex analysis, besides the demonstrable 
decrease in the power of masculine domination in the churches in the long 
run, that under the conditions of secularising modernity it is the church of 
the four institutions whose social influences has decreased most with the 
passing of time. 
 
 
Vision on History in Masculine Domination 
 
The true object of a history of relations between the sexes is thus 
the history of the successive combinations (...) of structural 
mechanisms (such as those which ensure the reproduction of the 
sexual division of labour) and strategies which, through institutions 
and individual agents, have perpetuated the structure of relations of 
domination between the sexes, in the course of a very long history, 
and sometimes at the price of real or apparent changes (Bourdieu, 
2001, pp. 83-84). 
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The question is whether Bourdieu’s above statements can be accepted or 
not. It is possibly tenable that from pre-modern societies represented by 
Kabyle peasants through the Bloomsbury circle to the 21st century certain 
elements of masculine domination bridging ages, social groups and diverse 
economic conditions, can be discerned. Further, it can be a justifiable 
ambition for a researcher to try and consider forces that provide for the 
maintenance of relations of domination in addition to the exploration of the 
factors of transformation. The author of this paper is also inclined to accept 
that changes first take place in the upper social strata (but – precisely in 
view of Bourdieu’s Distinction – it can be added that the norms, forms of 
taste and patterns of living that crystallize and become legitimate in the 
upper crust sooner or later ooze downward into the lower social strata as 
well). What is more, Bourdieu’s theoretical statement that habitus is 
inseparable from the structure can be regarded of key significance, too, as it 
was mentioned earlier. That is to say, a study of social praxis and hexis can 
and should take into account gender(ed) habitus as well. However, it seems 
to be a problematic statement that gender specificities should enjoy 
extraordinary autonomy: 
 
It is indeed astonishing to observe the extraordinary autonomy of 
sexual structures relative to economic structures, of modes of 
reproductions relative to modes of production. The same system of 
classificatory schemes is found, in its essential features, through the 
centuries and across economic and social differences, at the two 
extremes of the space of anthropological possibles, among the 
highland peasants of Kabylia and among the upper-class denizens 
of Bloomsbury (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 81). 
 
This is not only logically indefensible (for if habitus is inseparable from 
the structure, then changes in the structure will inevitably entail changes in 
habitus). Bourdieu himself writes, that  
 
dispositions (habitus) are inseparable from the structures 
(habitudines, in Leibniz’ sense) that produce and reproduce them, 
in both men and women, and in particular from the whole structure 
of technical and ritual activities that is ultimately grounded in the 
structure of the market in symbolic goods (Bourdieu, 2001, p.42). 
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On the basis of this claim, it seems to be axiomatic that, conditioned by 
the transformation of the whole structure, gender(ed) habituses are also 
changing in the long run. The above quotation also contradicts Bourdieu’s 
practice of analysis: a whole row of the author’s excellent empirical works 
proves that changes in the macrostructure or the structure of the field are 
intertwined with the habitual changes of the agents (Bourdieu, 1984, 1992).  
That is to say that Bourdieu uses a methodological trick at this point in 
order to be able to state that while economic and social structures change, 
gender(ed) structures determined by masculine domination are maintained 
or remain unaltered. The trick is that Bourdieu highlights changes in 
examining one type of social interdependencies and concentrates on 
permanence when looking at another type of social interdependencies. Or, 
the streaming river is compared to the riverside cliffs and not to another 
streaming river. Hence, it is justified to suspect that the argument is 
governed, not by the logic of empirical observations, but by the ambition to 
legitimate or illustrate certain preconceptions. If the subject is constructed 
in such a tricky manner, no scientific debate can be carried out about 
whether the “structure of the gap” between men and women is maintained 
or not by the end of the 20th century, because one can always find 
arguments torn from their complex historical context that may support the 
permanence of masculine domination, and others that support its 
changeability. 
What Bourdieu practically does in Masculine Domination when he 
speaks of the “power of the structure” and the “symbolic negative 
coefficient” is paradigm expansion, for he applies his thesis crystallised in 
its most sophisticated form in his Distinction (1984) about the displacement 
of social structure. In this book he analyzes the interrelations between 
different social classes in a three-dimensional space: examining the quantity 
of capital possessed by the classes and class fractions; the structure of this 
capital (the rate of economic and cultural capitals, the re-conversion 
strategies between different types of capital); and the temporal changes of 
these two factors. In a sophisticated and witty critical analysis of the French 
society of the ‘50s and ‘70s he writes (à propos the displacement of 
schooling rates of 16-to 18-year-olds between 1954 and 1975): 
 
Re-conversion strategies are nothing other than an aspect of the 
permanent actions and reactions whereby each group strives to 
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maintain or change its position in the social structure, or more 
precisely – at a stage in the evolution of class societies in which 
one can conserve only by changing – to change so as to conserve. 
Frequently the actions whereby each class (or class fraction) works 
to win new advantages, i.e., to gain an advantage over the other 
classes or so, objectively, to reshape the structure of objective 
relations between the classes (the relations revealed by the 
statistical distributions of properties), are compensated for (and so 
cancelled out ordinally) by the reactions of the other classes, 
directed toward the same objective. In this particular (though very 
common) case, the outcome of these opposing actions, which 
cancel each other by the very countermovements, which they 
generate, is an overall displacement of the structure of the 
distribution, between the classes or class fractions, of the assets at 
stake in the competition. (...) Thus, by an apparent paradox, the 
maintenance of order, that is, the whole set of gaps, differences, 
differentials, ranks, precedents, priorities, exclusions, distinctions, 
ordinal properties, and thus of the relations of order which give a 
social formation its structure, is provided by an unceasing change 
in substantial (i.e., non-relational) properties. This implies that the 
social order established at any given moment is also necessarily a 
temporal order, an “order of successions”, as Leibniz put it, each 
group having as its past the group immediately below and for its 
future the group immediately above (Bourdieu 1984, p.157–163). 
 
This lengthy quotation also illustrates the strategic specificity of 
Bourdieu’s paradigm-extension: in Masculine Domination all he does is to 
replace class by gender, and class habitus by gender(ed) habitus. When he 
discusses “the constancy of habitus”, “the negative symbolic coefficient by 
which women are separated from men”, the “permanence in and through 
change”, or the “strength of the structure”, he extends his theory about the 
displacement of the social structure to the displacement of the men/women 
relationship12. 
It is beyond this criticism to review Bourdieu’s reproduction theory in 
detail. Let’s merely note that while this theory is more or less adequate for 
the period between the last third of the 19th and the last third of the 20th 
centuries, it becomes problematic when it is applied to late-modern Western 
societies (and it is somewhat already problematic for the French society of 
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the 1960s-–1970s). Should we accept that “the social order established at 
any given moment is also necessarily a temporal order, an order of 
successions, each group having as its past the group immediately below and 
for its future the group immediately above”, we would be at a loss viewing 
the radical transformations that have fundamentally restructured social 
relations in multicultural Western societies over the past few decades13. 
Hence, contrary to Bourdieu’s claims, a consistent long-term social 
historical perspective would clearly reveal that, compared to earlier 
centuries the structurally conditioned social position of women had shifted 
towards emancipation in Europe; the female agent was gradually entering 
the stage of history, attaining a lot of the formulated demands: women 
defined by their motherhood became the protagonist of lots of 19th century 
disputes over population – both as agents and as subjects. All this can be 
interpreted as the increase in the relative power of the female agent. In 
France, for instance, threatened by Bismarck’s Germany, “depopulation” 
and “dénatalité” were considered to be a “social plague” and maternity 
became an object of many and contradictory comments” (Cova, 1991, p. 
119). The basis for this moral panic was that “whereas France had been the 
most densely populated country in Europe, by 1918 it ranked fifth in 
population. Many ‘repopulaters’ accused the feminists of being responsible 
for the declining birth-rate. The strategy of the feminist movement as a 
whole was to utilize that apparent demographic danger and the glorification 
of motherhood as a weapon in the struggle for the rights of mothers”. Maria 
Martin, the editor of Journal des femmes, wrote in 1896: “If you want 
children, learn to honour the mothers” (Cova, 1991, pp. 119-120). 
 
Conclusion 
 
After comparing the Masculine Domination’s two versions, and summing 
up the main claims of their critical reception, this paper intended to 
question the key statements of Pierre Bourdieu’s book, according to which 
the school, the family, the state and the church would reproduce, in the long 
run, masculine domination. It was argued that, with the exception of the 
church, the three other institutions had not maintained the permanence of 
masculine domination, but served the power balance between genders. It 
was also intended to identify the methodological trick of the Bourdieusian 
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vision on history, namely that, metaphorically speaking, he had compared 
the streaming river to the riverside cliffs. It was argued that while 
discussing “the constancy of habitus” and the “permanence in and through 
change”, or the “strength of the structure”, Bourdieu had extended his 
paradigm about the displacement of the social structure to the displacement 
of the men/women relationship.  
When, in opposition to Bourdieu’s approach, the analysis of gender 
relations is put into the historical context of complex social 
interdependencies, the conclusion may be drawn that masculine domination 
is not of universal validity but its structural weight and character have 
fundamentally changed in the long run. Around the 17th century the forms 
of masculinities and the nature of masculine domination began to be subject 
to considerable change in Europe: the fighting, knightly masculinity based 
on the archaic libido dominandi was gradually replaced by a competitive, 
throughout psychologised, pacified masculinity which permeated both the 
public and the intimate spheres and which later ramified into further sub-
variants.  
Women’s emancipation in the West was closely connected to one of the 
most important specificities of modernity, the potential of the fulfilment of 
future-oriented change. The success of feminism and female emancipation 
was an eloquent proof of this potential. In the long run, the masculine 
habitual centre gradually shifted from a social practice governed by the 
drives of physical violence to the praxis of rivalry and symbolic violence. 
This process implied that men had to control their violent impulses, and to 
incorporate dispositional elements that were associated with women in 
previous millennia. In other words, honour-based masculinity was bridled 
and the hunting, duelling, sword wielding warrior (“noblesse d’épée”) 
gradually transformed into a courtier (“noblesse de robe”) (Elias, 2000; 
Nye, 1998). It is regrettable that this fundamental structural change was 
overlooked by Bourdieu, who, in his Masculine Domination, over-
emphasized the importance of permanence and the symbolic aspect of 
violence. 
 
Notes 
 
1 Seemingly a trivial matter, it might be also of importance: in the contents of the French 
edition, the post-scriptum is printed as if it were the last chapter of the third part. By 
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contrast, the contents of the English version only include the three main parts without the 
subchapters. The lucidity of the argumentation is gravely marred thereby. 
2 As a sign of considerable self-restraint, Bourdieu omitted this passage from his book. 
3 The author of this text agrees with the overwhelming majority of these critical comments. 
If not so, a note will be made. 
4 This critique seems to be an overstatement because Bourdieu, in his best (referred to 
above), is capable of producing sophisticated empirical analyses that surpass schematic 
hyperfunctionalism. 
5 Unlike Fowler, the author of this article thinks that although Bourdieu’s theory of praxis 
does try to shun the trap of determinism, it defines less the (self)reflexivity of the agents as 
its main means but rather, stresses partly the freedom of (limited) improvisation ensured 
by habitus and partly the importance of the translational reproduction of the social 
structure. 
6 The term „school” are used on 10 pages according to the index of the French edition 
(Bourdieu 1998, p. 137). These quotations are significantly longer than those referring to 
the other three institutions. (The “education”-concept is missing from the index.). 
7 There are two more sentences (!) in the book concerning the family (in association with an 
article published in American Psychologist in 1977, entitled “Changes in Family Roles, 
Socialization, and Sex Differences”), but, interestingly, these sentences concern changes 
not permanence in the family (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 89). 
8 He ignores even his earlier research: although he devoted a long article to changes in 
family structures (Bourdieu, 1993b), but, interestingly, he does not take it into account in 
this book. 
9 To use Giddens’ term: sexuality is gaining plasticity:  
Plastic sexuality is decentred sexuality, freed from the needs of reproduction...) can be 
moulded as a trait of personality and thus is intrinsically bound up with the self. At the 
same time – in principle – it frees sexuality from the rule of the phallus, from the 
overweening importance of male sexual experience.” (Giddens 1992, p. 2). Giddens sets 
the new “emotional order” in the focus of attention which had a crucial role in the 
equalization of power relations between men and women in Western Modernity. He 
wishes to grasp this emotional order using three key concepts: “pure relationship”, “plastic 
sexuality”, and “the ethos of romantic love”. Pure relationship designates a “relationship 
of sexual and emotional equality” (Giddens 1992, p. 2), plastic sexuality means a 
“decentred sexuality, freed from the needs of reproduction” and “from the rule of the 
phallus”, the ethos of romantic love, the harbinger of the pure relationship, “presumes that 
a durable emotional tie can be established with the other on the basis of qualities intrinsic 
to that tie itself”. According to Giddens, although this ethos helps “to put women ‘in their 
place’ – the home”, its emergence “can be seen as an active, and radical, engagement with 
the ‘maleness’ of modern society (Giddens, 1992). 
10 In French: „ inculque (ou inculquait) explicitement une morale familialiste”. This bracket 
unveils that the present and the past are intermixed, i.e. the kernel of the matter, historicity 
is not taken into account. 
11 One discusses the ”expiatory ethos” of the Spanish church, the second is a study of French 
female mystics, and the third embarks on the representation of women in 16th century 
ecclesiastic art. From the latter he gives a citation in a footnote, which contains the far 
from surprising statement that the 16th century clerical books and sermons were written by 
men, and not by women. 
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12 One could go back even to earlier times and find that his thesis put forth in Distinction 
was already formulated from the beginning of his career. Significantly, in “La sociologie 
de l’ Algérie”, which is Bourdieu’s first book written in 1958, there is a chapter entitled 
“La permanence par le changement” [Permanence by change]. 
13 If the thesis of the overall displacement of the social structure would be extended from a 
national to an international context, it could be argued that the structural gap between 
genders is being reproduced as part of the Global North / Global South-divide 
(Hochschield & Ehrenreich, 2004). Bourdieu ignores this international dimension in this 
book. 
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